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There are certain views being advanced 
by academicians that are relevant to how 
we, as a society, relate to and treat animals 
and Nature. As will be shown, these views 
give support to the bio-politics of animal 
and Nature exploitation and, therefore, 
should .be challenged on ethical as well as 
scientific grounds. 
One view that is being advanced is that 
humans are superior to other animals. Those 
who adhere to such a belief may then be 
incapable of ethically objective and respon­
sible action toward animals, because they 
perceive animals as being inferior. With 
this preconceived notion that humans are 
superior (and that some animal species are 
more or less superior to others) the ethical­
ly objective principle of giving animals 
equal and fair consideration-~which is a 
basic premise of animal rights philosophy--is 
anathema. 
In apparent support of this view, Har­
vard University"sociobiologist" and science 
popularizer Edward o. Wilson has constructed 
a list of the ten most intelligent animals: 
1. Chimpanzee (two species) 
2. Gorilla 
3. Orangutan 
4.	 Baboon (seven species, includ­
ing drill and mandrill) 
5. Gibbon (seven species) 
6.	 Monkey (many species, especial­
ly macaques, the patas, and 
the Celebes black ape) 
7.	 Smaller toothed whale (several 
species, especially killer 
whale) 
8.	 Dolphin (many of the approxi­
mately 80 species) 
9. Elephant (two species) 
10.	 Pig. 
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Dr. Wilson adds: 
I defined intelligence as the speed 
and extent of learning performance 
over a wide range of tasks. Inso­
far as possible, the rank ordering 
was based in part on actual experi­
ments conducted on learning abili­
ty. In those cases where such 
studies have not been made, I re­
lied on the "encephalization in­
dex, " which measures the size of 
the brain relative to that of the 
body as a whole and has been shown 
to be roughly correlated with in­
telligence. Although I believe 
that my rank ordering is relatively 
sound, much more research is needed 
in this field of zoology, and chan­
ges in position can easily occur, 
especially near the bottom of the 
list of 10.[1] 
It should be pointed out, however, that 
"speed and extent of learning perfonnance 
over a wide range of tasks" and the "ence­
phalization index" are arbitrary, not abso­
lute, indices of intelligence. comparing the 
learning performance and brain size relative 
to that of the body of different species sets 
up absolute differences between species. And 
when a hierarchy is drawn up, a further er­
roneous inference is made, namely that of 
superiority. 
This "speciesist thinking" is a reflec­
tion of our own values, especially of our 
valuing intelligence as some special virtue. 
Such valuation can distort our perceptions of 
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other animals and influence how we treat them 
and value them in and for themselves. A 
"dumb beast," low in the sapience or I.Q. 
hierarchy, would not be accorded the same 
respect as a more intelligent species (i.e., 
one "more hlIDlaIl" in some respect). Yet, all 
animals should be respected equally, since 
they are all sentient, having the capacity to 
feel and to suffer. 
While comparing different species is one 
avenue to understanding evolution, adapta-
tion, and the structure and function of liv-
ing things, making comparisons on the basis 
of biased, hlIDlaIl-centered values can have 
pernicious ramifications. Any hierarchy (of 
superior-inferior, greater-lesser) sets up a 
false view of reality, and when it is imposed 
upon the animal kingdom, it can break the 
circle of compassion within which all crea-
tures should be regarded and treated with 
equal reverence and respect. 
That Professor Wilson listed the chim-
p3IlZee first and not HalD sapiens is his 
first biological error. But it is, I be-
lieve, a politically coercive, if not uncon-
scious, omission. It would seem by this 
omission that Wilson would have us believe 
that we are so superior to all other animals 
that we do not rank with them. Yet, are we 
not, along with the gorilla and orangutan, 
less intelligently adapted to life in the 
water than a dolphin (which he ranks eighth)? 
And is not a tenth-ranking pig more intelli-
gent at being a pig, and living in its own 
particular environmental niche, than a dol-
phin or a chimpanzee could ever be? 
What is Professor Wilson doing? other 
biologists before him placed Negro and Euro-
pean and Asian peasant races beneath their 
white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideal of su-
periority and hlIDlaIl perfection. With such an 
arrogant attitude of patriarchal supremacy 
over others and the rest of creation, no 
ethical decision could be objective and un-
biased. All moral choices would be decided 
upon by sane arbitrary consensus of reality 
and of our supreme place in Nature that would 
be ultimately self-serving. Wilson's animal 
I.Q. hierarchy sets up the pyramid of power. 
Is it not as "speciesist" as his predecessor 
bio-politicians were racist? 
Then there is philosopher Mortimer Ad-
ler, whose books, like biologist Wilson's, 
present the speciesist view of human superi-
ority over the animal kingdom as some irre-
futable truth. His writings have wide public 
appeal and have been lauded by educators, 
though ob'1er philosophers generally ignore 
his pontifications. 
In many of his writings, he has argued 
that rationality is the highest virtue and 
that since humans are the only truly rational 
beings on Earth, they are superior to the 
rest of creation, and, consequently, there is 
nothing morally wrong in exploiting animals. 
In his most recent popular book, Ten 
Philosophical Mistakes, he supports the views 
of Thomas Aquinas, who derived his philosophy 
from Aristotle and incorporated it into 
Christian theology, reasoning, for example, 
that only rational beings (Le., humans) have 
immortal souls. Animals are, therefore, 
inferior. So, naturally, Adler is critical 
of Charles Darwin (who was cognizant of ani-
mals' emotions and was concerned about their 
widespread mistreatment, especially by vivi-
sectors) for classifying hlIDlaIls as animals. 
Professor Adler contends that hlIDlaIls alone 
can conceive of right and wrong. Thus, hu-
mans are a superior kind of being, capable of 
moral responsibility and ethical conduct. 
However, we, unlike animals, have the power 
of free-will to act irrmorally and unethical-
ly, so does this not make us "inferior" to 
other animals? That it is in our best inter-
ests to be morally right and ethically re-
sponsible is a sign of enlightened self-
interest, not of superiority over the animal 
kingdom. It is worth noting that Adler 
stresses the difference in sapience of hlIDlaIls 
over animals that makes us superior, rather 
than emphasizing (as did Darwin) the similar-
ities in sentience--in emotional reactions 
and feelings--that make us feel kinship and 
compassion rather than superiority. 
It should be emphasized that many oppon-
ents of animal rights philosophy have argued 
that only hlIDlaIls can have rights because only 
hlIDlaIls can act as moral agents. Non-rational 
animals having no sense of right or wrong, 
cannot, therefore, have rights. But since 
babies and comatose patients, who are neither 
rational nor capable of being moral agents, 
have rights because they are recognized as 
"moral objects," it is illogical not to re-
gard animals also as objects of moral concern 
with interests and, therefore, as rights-
holders. Adler's thinking leads to the oppo-
site conclusion, denying animals their 
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totally exclude continuity.rights. 
It is also significant and disturbing 
that in his latest book, Adler endorses the 
Thomistic view (derived fran Aristotle) that 
ideas are basic concepts by which we under-
stand experiences and reality as we perceive 
it. These basic concepts are the fOW1dation 
of W1iversal truths, which are immutable, he 
insists. Ethically blind to the biased, 
hurran-centered worldview that certain basic 
concepts and beliefs might support, it is to 
be expected that if the consensus holds that 
other animals are inferior to us, then it 
must be an inmutable truth. 
Jim Harter, Animals: 14Z2 
COp;YYi~ht-Freen!Ustra :lons. 
New ork: Dover, 1979 
Adler's philosophy supports Wilson's 
biology, the fusion of which I would term 
"biological fascism." In an earlier book, 
The Difference of Man and the Difference It 
Makes, Adler argues that if there is a sig-
nificant difference in kind, rather than in 
degree, between hurrans and animals (which has 
not yet been proven or W1ambiguously agreed 
upon), then our not giving animals equal and 
fair consideration is ethically tenable. He 
notes that 
[Hence] a single all-embracing con-
tinuum in nature need not exclude 
all differences. It allows for 
differences in degree and for su-
perficial differences in kind. It 
excludes only radical differences 
in kind; for, if such exist, there 
is an underlying discontinuity in 
nature. Nor does a hierarchy of 
forms in nature (involving, as it 
does, radical differences in kind) 
But even if humans, with their cognitive, 
linguistic and technological abilities repre-
sent a discontinuity in Nature, and differ in 
kind rather than in degree fran animals as 
Adler proposes (and one may wonder about his 
llDtives for doing so), we do know that in 
terms of sentience, the capacity to feel and 
to suffer, that animals do not differ signi-
ficantly fran us in kind. .Adler focuses his 
argument on differences in sapience, which 
reflects the basically rational materialism 
of his Aristotelean, human-centered philoso-
phy. By ignoring animal sentience, as well 
as recognition of their interests, he con-
dones their exploitation on the basis of our 
apparently superior intellect. Adler justi-
fies differential treatment by concluding 
that animals are neither rational nor llDral. 
The differences in kind between humans 
and animals are deeply entrenched in reli-
gious and philosophical beliefs (not univers-
al, illlllUtable truths) that humans and humans 
alone are made in God's image, that humans 
are a special creation, that only humans have 
i.rnroortal souls. Since the only proven dif-
ference is in our intellective, technologic-
al, and linguistic abilities, these differen-
ces, when weighed against the many similari-
ties that we share anatanically, physiologic-
ally, biochemically, and ellDtionally with 
animals are insufficient to justify on llDral 
grounds our calling animals mere "things" and 
treating them accordingly. It is simply a 
question of pure expediency, since I believe 
that there are no llDrally relevant differen-
ces between us and animals to permit us to 
exploit them as "things," purely as a means 
to satisfy human ends. 
Darwin must have understcxxl this dilem-
ma, for he wrote "We are not superior" on his 
hand as a daily reminder.[2] That we are 
part of the one life and of a unified field 
shatters the notion of biological, evolution-
ary, and other hierarchies that are con-
structs derived not fran universal and inmut-
able truths but fran our own self-centered, 
superior, and daninionistic attitude toward 
animals and the rest of God's creation. 
In addition to the potentially negative 
bio-political implications of the above bio-
logical and philosopucal views, there is a 
theological view, gaining popularity allDngst 
scientists and humanists alike, that could 
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lead to a widespread acceptance of the ex-
tinction of the animal kingdan as being as 
natural and inevitable as evolution itself. 
Jesuit scientist and renowned theologian . 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin speaks of the 
"haninisation" of Earth. In other words, the 
world of Nature and the animal kingdan are 
taken over by HallO sapiens and transfonned 
(by what he calls "techno-involution," Le., 
via scientific-technological innovations). 
this he considered a natural consequence of 
the mutation in consciousness (reflective 
awareness) that makes us the special creation 
that we are. 
In his book Man's Place in Nature, he 
accepts the industrialization of Nature as 
natural and inevitable: 
We must realize that the continual-
ly greater industrialisation of the 
earth is simply the h1.nllCill-collec-
tive fonn of a universal process of 
vitalisation which, in this as in 
all other cases, can only lead, if 
we knO\v the right way in which to 
approach it, to interiorisation and 
freedan. 
His lack of critical analysis of the adverse 
consequences of the industrialization of 
earth, and of articulating "the right way in 
which to approach it," would surely be forth-
coming today if he had lived and extended his 
philosophy in the light of today's environ-
mental awareness. His faith in h1.nllCill pro-
gress as being ultimately self-correcting and 
stabilizing though foresight and choice may 
be an optimist's dream. His vision was not 
grounded in the reality of h1.nllCill destructive-
ness of the biosphere, for he saw the de-
struction of stable lands as the one serious 
threat to h1.nllCill progress which would likely 
be temporary and corrected by technological 
innovation. The spiritual and econanic con-
sequences of destroying Nature or of trans-
forming the biosphere into an industrial 
system for our exclusive h1.nllCill use are not 
considered. 
Teilhard de Chardin has been rightly 
criticized by many philosophers, conserva-
tionists, and others for not incorporating 
concern for the biosphere as a living system 
and concern for species other than his own. 
greatly respect his work, however, and join 
others in acknowledging that he has helped 
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break Christianity fran the salvafic and 
hierarchical cosmology of an annipotent and 
anthrop:xnorphic divinity. Indeed, he empha-
sized the creative, rather than salvafic, and 
while his mysticism was ultimately anthropo-
centric, his concept of divinity was closer 
to Whitehead's process thinking (and to Spi-
noza's and Einstein's concept of divinity) 
than to the church of Rane' s anthrop:xnorphic 
view of God. Hence his works were suppressed 
by the Catholic authority of Papal decree for 
many years. (He was also challenging the 
church's patriarchal structure and entire 
cosmology. ) 
Teilhard stopped short of pantheism when 
he saw "Christo-genesis"--the spiritual awa-
kening of Christ-consciousness--as the final 
point in human evolution (as Hom::> sapiens) • 
And his view was ultimately hierarchical, 
since he put people at the top of the evolu-
tionary process. 
Pantheism may then be the next religious 
perspective, but there may soon be nothing 
left of Nature to revere, if we continue to 
neglect and destroy the biosphere. Had Teil-
hard realized how critical the state of the 
biosphere already was when he was elaborating 
his cosmology (but few people were aware in 
the 1950's and early 1960's) and had he not 
such a naive faith in scientific and techno-
logical progress (as most people had in the 
relief and optimism in those two post-World 
War II decades), then he might not have ex-
cluded concern for Nature and the rest of 
creation. He did not see how "techno-involu-
tion"--scientific and technological "pro-
gress"--could destroy the biosphere. He saw 
it as the interface between the biosphere and 
the evolving "noosphere" (which is difficult 
to define simply but might be envisioned as a 
matrix of h1.nllCill consciousness, communication, 
power, and control that envelops the bio-
sphere). Teilhard would agree that without a 
biosphere, there can be no noosphere and that 
a destructive technology would destroy both. 
Father Thanas Berry, of the Riverdale Center 
for Religious Studies, [3] has written several 
treatises to help put Teilhardianism into its 
proper contemporary setting. 
Scientists and others who are attracted 
to Teilhard 's cosmology have found it help-
ful, I believe, in alleviating their con-
sciences over the armihilation of the bio-
sphere and the present holocaust of the ani-
mal kingdan. All this is rationalized as 
I 
being a natural consequence of evolution--
horninisation--so it doesn't matter. From 
this perspective, to worry about saving 
wolves and snow leopards is as silly today as 
it would have been stupid for sane sentiment-
al aliens to have saved the dinosaurs from 
extinction. (And had they done so, then we 
humans would not exist!) Their extinction is 
in the natural scheme. But since Teilhard 
never discussed the threatened status of the 
biosfhere and the ani-mal kingdom and its 
ethical and evolutionary implications, it is 
hardly right to conclude that his philosofhY 
accepts, or considers, natural the destruc-
tion of Nature--the biosfhere. (And under 
"destruction" I include loss of species, 
genetic diversity, habitats, ecosystems, and 
resources and poisoning of the entire planet-
ary ecosystem.) 
Because of his faith in evolution/God, 
he did not doubt that only good would arise 
from the transformation of the biosfhere by 
technology and hanonisation. He died too 
soon, but as I said, he did at least turn the 
church's attention away from its emphasis on 
world-negating salvation, toward recognition 
of the divine mystery that evolutionary bio-
logy reveals. A world-affirming emfhasis 
upon the creative process rather than upon 
salvation is now being encouraged by Father 
Berry and others. In essence, this is a 
return to Nature, not to pantheism, but at 
least toward a reverence for the Earth and 
God's creations. 
In conclusion, I have endeavored to 
dem::mstrate, by selecting sane of the ideas 
of contemporary thinkers in the fields of 
biology, philosophy, and theology, how these 
disciplines can be used to alienate people 
from animals and Nature. This alienation 
process, whereby people are led to believe 
that they are superior to animals and that 
there is no moral or ethical issue in the 
wholesale exploitation of animals and nature, 
is the bio-politics of contemporary science, 
philosofhY, and theology whose worldview is 
self-serving and anthropocentric--and thus 
lacking in scholarly objectivity and ethical 
sensibility. Educators, scientists, philoso-
fhers, and others need to be aware of the 
subtle and insidious ramifications of the 
worldview espoused by those whose attitude 
toward animals and Nature is neither demo-
cratic nor egalitarian. Rather, it can lead 
to the bio-politics of fascism and imperial-
ism under the guise of academia's infallible 
wisdom and scholarly facade of scientific 
objectivity and truthfulness. 
Notes 
1. The Book of Lists (New York: Wil-
Ham and Morrow). 
2. James Malcolm, personal communica-
tion. 
3. 5801 Palisade Avenue, Bronx, New 
York 10471. 
ANIMALS. 
i Do they matter? 
An exciting new awareness is 
unfolding- ahout our relationship 
with animals and the rest of the 
natural world. Read ahollt it in 
THE ANIMALS' AGENDA. 
NAME _ 
~,.REET _ 
CITY STATE __ ZIP _ 
7 BElWEEN' THE SPECIES 
